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In a rapidly evolving world with increasing disruptive technologies, multiple stakeholders across nations, industries 
and sectors are confronting growing societal demands about the need for ethics and regulatory frameworks on cross-
border data flows (CBDFs). What does this mean and how to get started? These and many more are pressing questions 
facing policy-makers in multilateral forums with the aims of addressing recent quantifiable impacts of digital trade—a 
trade dimension comprising the global exchanges of emerging technologies, e.g., data flows, e-commerce, in late twenty 
and early twenty first centuries. While trade agreements and regional regulatory frameworks have intended to dictate 
principles, norms and rules for several concerns around CBDFs, institutional efforts for setting up an inclusive, multi-
lateral framework are still lacking in the policy arena. With this motivation, the present paper illustrates the case of 
Euro Zone’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) as the most comprehensive legal instrument up to date that 




The late twenty and early twenty-first centuries have 
brought new opportunities in the way of doing business 
and rethinking the role of public policies and international 
law instruments in technological affairs. For the most part, 
these opportunities have emerged from rapid advances in 
disruptive technologies that have altered living and work-
ing standards, innovation channels of production, among 
other social and economic dynamics in societies. In 2013, 
the McKinsey Global Institute identified twenty-five dis-
ruptive technologies that gathered four key features trans-
forming the future of work and doing businesses: (a) rapid-
ly-advancing technologies; (b) broad potential scope of 
impact; (c) significant economic value; and (d) potentially-
disruptive economic impact.1   
The emergence of disruptive technologies during recent 
decades has opened the path for the global digital era that 
is increasingly shaping the future of work and systemic 
transitions in the world’s economy. Accordingly to the 
McKinsey Global Institute (MGI, 2016) report, Digital 
globalization: The new era of global flows, “some 900 
million people have international connections on social 
media, and 360 million take part in cross-border e-
commerce.”2 MGI’s further analysis revealed that cross-
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2 McKinsey Global Institute, Digital Globalization: The New Era 
of Global Flows, 2016, https://www.mckinsey.com/business-
border data flows (CBDFs) accounted for USD 2.8 trillion 
in 2014 alone, which represented about 36 percent of glob-
al flows of all types valued in USD 7.8 trillion over the same 
year.3 This trend outlines the significance of economic im-
pact driven by digital trade, e.g., e-commerce, data flows, 
which along with all types of flows increased world GDP by 
10.1 percent.4 
With an exponential amount of data and information 
generated in the digital space during recent years, citizens 
and consumers of digital platform services have increased 
their concerns about data privacy and consumer protec-
tion. Over the last three years alone, an IBM Marketing 
Cloud study found that 90 percent of all data online has 
been created since 2016, with 2.5 quintillion bytes of data 
being created every day.5 The significant size of data flows 
managed by digital platforms has led costumers to express 
concerns about their data privacy across the globe. In the 
U.S., The TRUSTe/National Cyber Security Alliance 
(NCSA, 2016) reported that “… 60 percent of Americans 
are more concerned about not knowing how personal in-
formation collected online is used than losing principle 
income…”6 In the Philippines, Viber conducted a data pri-
vacy customers’ survey and obtained that 55.3 percent of 
individuals expressed they would stop using an app that 
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shares their data with third-parties without their 
knowledge.7  
In response to consumer protection and data privacy 
concerns around disruptive technologies, the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 
2016) has acknowledge the institutional need to establish 
more compatible legal frameworks at national, regional 
and multilateral levels.8 While some countries grouped by 
regional or trade blocks have attempted to develop their 
CBDFs regulations in unilateral or bilateral basis, remain-
ing gaps on CBDFs universal definitions, legally-binding 
rules and cross-countries enforcement mechanisms alto-
gether make the case for a CBDFs multilateral framework. 
In this regard, UNCTAD (2016) identified three categories 
of gaps existent in the coverage of data protection laws: (a) 
Absence of country-level data protection legislation—nearly 
30 percent of countries with no laws in place; (b) current 
legislation with broad gaps and exemptions; and (c) allow-
ances for business to exclude certain services or practices 
from coverage.9 
Regulatory Framework on CBDFs 
Although multilateral rules governing CBDFs in a uni-
versal and comprehensive manner are still missing in the 
policy arena, regional and international organizations have 
developed regulatory frameworks addressing data privacy, 
consumer protection, among other related concerns around 
CBDFs. The Global System for Mobile Communications 
Association (GSMA, 2018) identified six mainstreaming 
data privacy frameworks that have recently been estab-
lished in regional or international basis: (a) OECD Privacy 
Framework, (b) Convention 108, (c) Madrid Resolution, (d) 
APEC Privacy Framework, (e) ASEAN Framework on Per-
sonal Data Protection, and (f) EU GDPR.10 On the other 
hand, privacy has been treated under rules of trade agree-
ments. Regarding this, Aaditya Mattoo and Joshua Meltyer 
(2018) pointed out privacy treatments across three repre-
sentative trade agreements: (a) the WTO rules contained in 
the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS); (b) 
Korea-US FTA, with its Chapter 15 covering Electronic 
Commerce; and (c) the Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership—CPTPP, outlin-
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ing provisions on data data flows and e-commerce in its 
chapter 14.11 Mattoo and Meltyer (2018), furthermore, 
stressed on the relevance of four additional privacy and 
data flows instruments derived from international regula-
tory cooperation: (a) the OECD Privacy Guidelines; (b) The 
Council of Europe Data Protection Convention and Addi-
tional Protocol; (c) the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC); and (d) the E.U.-U.S. Privacy Shield.12  
Despite the extensive bulk of regional and international 
instruments and trade rules including provisions on priva-
cy, data flows and customer protection, almost all of these 
lack legally-binding conditions as pointed out by several 
authors and institutions. For instance, the Congressional 
Research Services (CRS, 2019) emphasized that up-to-date 
best practice guidelines or principles related to privacy and 
CBDFs are not legally binding in multilateral basis.13 
Summing up this legal constrain to the institutional gaps 
on data protection laws reported by UNCTAD (2016) sup-
port the case that CBDFs should be regulated multilateral-
ly. Though, the question facing policy-makers around the 
world is where to start?  
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
The General Data Protection Regulation—or GDPR—is 
the EU regulation on the natural persons’ privacy, data 
protection and CBDFs approved by the European Parlia-
ment on April 27, 2016, being later enforced on May 25, 
2018.14 The GDPR replaces the Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC and according to an educational website, it was 
designed with three specific objectives: (a) harmonize data 
privacy laws across Europe; (b) protect and empower all 
EU citizens’ data privacy; and (c) reshape the way organiza-
tions across the region approach data privacy.15 In less 
than a year since its enforcement, GDPR has proven to 
redirecting data management procedures across sectors 
and redefining the roles for key leaders in businesses to 
some extent. The European Commission (EC) conducted 
an implementation performance study in early 2019 and 
found increasing outcomes in rules’ compliance, enforce-
ment and awareness in the EU region.16 In terms of com-
pliance, the number of complaints from individuals to Data 
Protection Authorities (DPA) increased up to 95,180 from 
May, 2018 to January, 2019. Individuals have mostly ex-
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pressed their complaints regarding telemarketing, promo-
tional e-mails and video surveillance/CCTV. Furthermore, 
GDPR has led to significant enforcement outcomes. Among 
these, DPAs have been able to start some 255 investiga-
tions, out of which 200 have been on the basis of individual 
complaints. Enforcing the rules has also been materialized 
by the imposition of fines, e.g., EUR 50 million imposed by 
France to Google for lack of consent on Ads, and the adap-
tation of mandated national laws in the EU Member 
States—23 member states have adopted the required na-
tional regulation while five are still pending to do so. Last-
ly, awareness of the rules from the GDPR has received 
higher attention in the media in relative terms.17  
Application 
Is the GDPR a sound instrument to model multilateral 
regulatory frameworks on CBDFs? There has been a candid 
debate on whether the GDPR could be a plausible instru-
ment to shape a multilateral approach governing free 
movements of data, consumer protection and data privacy. 
Aaditya Mattoo and Joshua Meltzer (2018), among other 
authors, have presented cases against CBDFs multilateral 
framework proposals based on the GDPR model.18 On the 
other hand, authors such as Consumer International (2019) 
have recently stated to be in favor of CBDFs.19 Whereas the 
positions against GDPR primarily focus on the instru-
ment’s potentially adverse economic impacts from a doing-
business point of view, e.g., possible reductions on export 
data transfer services from developing countries to devel-
oped countries, those in favor of GDPR highlight its bal-
ance in managing economic benefits from CBDFs, data 
privacy and customer protection regulations for both com-
panies and customer, ultimately benefiting the latter to a 
larger extent.   
On the basis of the debate around GDPR, I would argue 
that GDPR could be a stepping stone in building solid 
foundations for a multilateral framework on CBDFs, data 
privacy and consumer protection. The supporting points of 
my in-favor positions for the GDPR lie in two key broad 
elements contained in its legal body: (a) precise rules on 
personal data collection, transference, process and storage; 
and (b) legally-binding conditions.  
GDPR’s Precise Rules on Data Management 
According to PrivacyPolicies.com, the GDPR contains 
at least six categories of articles stating precise rules on the 
way of how firms collect, transfer, process and store data 
from their customer while granting EU citizens certain 
rights and protection concerning their personal infor-
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mation.20 These six categories and their corresponding 
articles are as follows: 
Rights of Individuals: 
▪ Art. 6 – Lawfulness of processing 
▪ Art. 15 – Right of access by the data subject 
▪ Recital 59 – Procedures for the exercise of the rights of 
the data subjects 
▪ Art. 16 – Right to rectification 
▪ Art. 18 – Right to restriction of processing 
▪ Art. 20 – Right to data portability 
▪ Art. 21 – Right to object 
 
Rights to Be Informed: 
▪ Recital 58 – The principle of transparency 
 
Right to Erasure (“Right to be Forgotten”): 
▪ Art. 17 – Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’) 
 
Data Protection Officer: 
▪ Recital 97 – Data protection officer 
 
Obligations for Data Processors: 
▪ Art. 28 – Processor 
 
Data Protection Impact Assessment: 
▪ Recital 85 – Notification obligation of breaches to the 
supervisory authority 
 
GDPR’s legally-binding Conditions 
The GDPR contains two key articles stressing out legal-
ly-binding conditions by which the rules and stipulations of 
its legal body govern the subjected parties. These articles 
are as follows: 
▪ Art. 28 – Processor.  
▪ Art. 47 – Binding corporate rules 
Conclusions 
In Sum, the GDPR’s specific rules on data management 
and legally-binding conditions set out solid foundations 
that may guide cornerstone principles and enforcement 
mechanisms on CBDFs, data privacy and consumer protec-
tion under multilateral basis. From allowing individual 
rights on data processing consent, access to information, 
and erasure to dictating obligations for data processors, 
such as the appointment of Data Protection Officers and 
the implementation of data protection impact assessments, 
the GDPR aims at empowering citizens data privacy while 
harmonizing and organizing cross-countries CBDFs man-
agement. While the GDPR has been disregarded as a sound 
model for multilateral regulatory frameworks on CBDFs, it 
has demonstrated consistent, positive outcomes in terms of 
compliance, enforcement and awareness across countries 
in the EU region, building up in its supportive case to a 
CBDFs global approach.
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Decades In The Making: The EU-Mercosur Agreement 
Guilherme Thudium, Luana M. Geiger, Marc Castillo, Sírio Sapper 
Abstract 
The signing of the Mercosur-EU trade agreement in 2019 at the G20 summit has truly expanded the global reach of 
the South American trade block as a multilateral player and represents the single largest trade deal ever pulled off by 
both the European Union and Mercosur. The purpose of this paper is to briefly analyze the specifics of the agreement, as 
well as the motivations that led to its signing after a 20 year period of on-and-off negotiations. We also try to contextu-
alize this agreement with other FTAs that the EU has pursued in the Americas over the past decade, such as the TTIP, 
CETA, and the EU-Mexico Trade Agreement. We argue that these new mega-regional agreements, although rooted in 




Accounting for almost 800 million people and a quarter 
of the world's GDP, the European Union (EU) and Mer-
cosur sealed a powerful free trade agreement in 2019 cov-
ering goods, services, investments and government pro-
curement, breaking the stalemate of a 20-year on-and-off 
negotiation process. The EU-Mercosur agreement is seen 
as a historical moment in the midst of international trade 
tensions and represents the largest single deal that both 
trade blocs have ever concluded. 
For Mercosur, the agreement means that the trade bloc 
is now entering the world of modern and ambitious prefer-
ential trade agreements (PTAs)2, a reality that the EU is 
more familiar with. This paper assumes that the EU-
Mercosur trade agreement is part of the further deepening 
of a mega-regional trade agenda which is responsible for 
the expansion of the economic landscape and the formation 
of new rules of trade, operationalized through mega-
regional agreements such as the EU-Mercosur trade 
agreement, that sometimes bypass the World Trade Organ-
ization (WTO). As a result, modern mega-regional agree-
ments have a great influence over the international trading 
system and the shaping of the global order.3 
The coexistence of multilateralism and regionalism in 
the formation of the rules of trade has entered a stage of 
conflict, or what american political scientist Robert Keo-
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hane calls “counter-multilateralism”.4 This phenomenon 
occurs when states and/or non-state actors shift their focus 
from one existing multilateral institution, creating an al-
ternative way. Other examples of significant mega-regional 
trade agreements that the EU has pursued over the past 
years in the Americas are the Transatlantic Trade and In-
vestment Partnership (TTIP) with the US, the Comprehen-
sive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada, 
and the EU-Mexico Trade Agreement. At the same time, 
Mercosur has also concluded negotiations in substance 
with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in Au-
gust, 2019.5 While there exists a notion of anti-globalism at 
present that can be interpreted as a form of "counter-
multilateralism" there exists a tendency towards multilat-
eralism through trade blocks.  This new multilateralism 
exudes regionalism as both the EU and Mercosur are re-
gional powers both of which are in a way supporting the 
mantle of globalism by purporting trade and the sentiment 
that even though the world may be appearing more antag-
onistic there is an underlying approach that the world is 
flat. 
However, the deal is not yet sealed. The two blocs need 
to finalize the legal text of the mega-regional EU-Mercosur 
agreement, which will then be submitted to the European 
Parliament for ratification. The purpose of this paper is to 
provide a brief historical background to the agreement 
since the formal start of negotiations in 1999, as well as to 
highlight some of its features and complexities.  
Evolution of the Trade Talks 
During most of the 20th century, European interest in 
Latin America has been scant. Since the turn of the century, 
however, the EU started to regard Brazil as a possible lead-
er in South America capable of containing Hugo Chávez’s 
influence and offseting Bolivarianism by striking a balance 
between economic growth and social inclusion.6 In 1999, 
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the year Chávez rose to power in Venezuela, the first EU-
Latin America summit, held in Rio de Janeiro, established 
a strategic partnership between both regions. The common 
perception among European policymakers at that time was 
that the EU shared common values with Brazil when it 
came to the defense of multilateralism in global politics, 
political stability, the maintenance of democratic regimes 
and the fight against poverty in the region. 
The premise of a Latin American block reaching out be-
yond Washington’s influence is nouveaux and rather dar-
ing. Latin America has long appeared to form an unques-
tionable part of Washington’s zone of influence, but even 
though the U.S. is the main trading partner of the region as 
a whole, Mercosur does nearly half as much trade with the 
EU.7 Concurrently, EU exports to Mercosur have more 
than doubled between 2005 and 2015.8 Washington’s in-
fluence over Latin America appears to be waning as Latin 
countries are reaching out toward both East and West ei-
ther through China or Europe.  
According to the directors of the Center for Studies in 
Integration and Development Sandra Polónio Rios and 
Pedro da Motta Veiga, "while the EU is open to trade but 
protective mostly of its agricultural products (exactly the 
sector where Mercosur can boast its comparative ad-
vantage), Mercosur brings together some of the most 
closed markets for manufactured goods." Several factors 
made the agreement possible, especially political ones. 
Regarding the European side Rios and Veiga state that, 
"the impending end of the European Commission’s term in 
office and its desire to counter rising protectionism in the 
United States played an important role". The European 
Commission, therefore, wants to establish the agreement as 
a legacy for the future, since it represents the largest trade 
agreement ever signed by the EU.  At the same time, the 
trade agreement will increase European pressure on the 
Brazilian government to abide by the dispositions of the 
2015 Paris Agreement and improve the business environ-
ment in the country. 
In this sense, the probability of ratification of the Mer-
cosur-EU treaty depends also on intra-European political 
dynamics, especially in Berlin. It is important to highlight 
the protagonist role Germany is playing in the EU, not only 
by dealing with the recent crises that hit the continent, but 
also by leading the negotiations of free trade agreements. 
Due to its central economic and geopolitical position in 
Europe, an understanding of the German debate is essen-
tial for the future of the agreement, since Germany and its 
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policies will clearly influence the direction and general 
prospects of the project. 
It's been said that Germany has finally become an “im-
perial power” in Europe9, something that the country his-
torically failed to achieve through military force. Germany 
is the most populous nation in Europe, with over 82 mil-
lion inhabitants, and the largest economy of the continent 
– the fifth of the world by purchasing power parity (PPP). 
From a geopolitical standpoint, it is inevitable that Berlin 
reinterprets its foreign policy by making it more suitable to 
its condition as a pivot catering both to the EU as well as to 
the needs of an economic power strongly dependent on 
international trade. 
Germany has a massive current account surplus, now 
the largest in the world, and the EU-Mercosur agreement 
can be extremely beneficial for its economy. However, 
leaders from Germany and Brazil, the two most significant 
regional players in Europe and Mercosur, strongly disagree 
on topics such as climate change and environmental pro-
tection. Thus, the EU-Mercosur trade deal hinges on Ger-
many's reaction to the controversial policies of Brazilian 
president, Jair Bolsonaro.10 This flashpoint between a 
European country´s climate paradigms and the Bolsonaro 
administration is a normal point of contention that will 
likely complicate discussions but it will not ultimately pre-
vent a successful outcome. 
At the same time, other European countries may pose 
challenges to the agreement. For instance, ‘France and 
Ireland have been skeptical about the trade deal since ne-
gotiations began in 1999, as it would strongly affect their 
agricultural industries’.11 The first political blow to the 
agreement came from Vienna: in September 2019, the Aus-
trian parliament rejected the proposed trade pact, casting 
doubt over the future of the project. According to EU law, 
all 28 member states and their parliaments must agree to 
the trade deals negotiated by the European Commission.  
Specifics of the negotiations 
European-South American economic cooperation at-
tempts occurred prior to the establishment of the EU mon-
etary union. In 1994, influential Spanish politician Manuel 
Marín12 suggested setting up a free trade area between 
Mercosur and its European counterparts for the first time. 
Marín was partially responsible for a kind of Copernican 
Revolution in EU-Mercosur relations. At that time, the 
relations between South America and Europe were more 
inclined towards social assistance programs. So the Euro-
pean Commission recommended a bold plan to boost Eu-
ropean access to the region – which was initially criticized 
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by lobbying groups, political authorities, and some sectors 
of the media in Europe.  
After a pre-stage negotiation period (1994-1999), formal 
talks were held between 1999 and 2004, marking the first 
stage of negotiations. An exchange of offers took place in 
2004, when both parties made available their market ac-
cess overtures, but it disappointed both sides and trade 
talks were soon interrupted. As a result, the following six 
years were marked by a blockade in negotiations. Trade 
talks were then relaunched in 2010, and an agreement was 
finally reached during the 2019 G20 summit, which was 
held in Japan. 
The prospective association agreement between Mer-
cosur and the EU includes three pillars: political dialogue, 
cooperation and free trade. The trade agreement is made 
up of chapters and annexes on topics such as tariff reduc-
tion commitments, customs and trade facilitation, sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures, public procurement, technical 
barriers to trade, subsidies, competition, transparency, as 
well as intellectual property rights, dispute settlement and 
sustainable development. The text also has a political and 
cooperation chapter, covering several strategic areas, 
among them: science, technology and innovation, infra-
structure, education, consumer rights, energy, defense, 
cybersecurity and the fight against terrorism. 
 The agreement will extensively liberalize trade in 
goods. Before the agreement, only 24% of Brazilian ex-
ports, in terms of tariff lines, entered tariff free in the EU. 
Following the agreement, 92% of Mercosur imports and 
95% of tariff lines will enter tariff-free in the EU. Mercosur 
will liberalize 91% of its imports from the EU over a period 
of up to 10 years for most products (sensitive products will 
be allowed up to 15 years).13 14 
In 2018, the bi-regional trade flow between the EU and 
Mercosur surpassed US$ 90 billion. Brazil exported over 
US$ 42 billion to the EU, approximately 18% of the total 
exported by the country. The EU is also the largest foreign 
investor in Mercosur. In 2017, the EU investment stock in 
the South American bloc totaled US$ 433 billion. Brazil is 
also the fourth largest foreign direct investment (FDI) des-
tination of the EU outside any economic block 
 Regarding the agricultural sector, the EU repre-
sents the largest importer in the world, having imported 
US$ 182 billion in 2018. Brazil, as its second largest suppli-
er of agricultural products, will have its access conditions 
further improved. Approximately US$ 14 billion in agricul-
tural products, 32% of Brazil's export list, were exported to 
the EU - mainly animal food inputs, coffee, oilseeds, grains 
and meat. In this sector, the EU will liberalize 82% of trade 
volume and 77% of tariff lines, as well as allowing preferen-
tial access to the South American bloc. As part of the 
agreement Mercosur will liberalize 96% of trade volume 
and cut down 94% of tariff lines.  Looking solely at the ag-
ricultural aspect of the agreement both sides can make 
substantial gains from each other.   





 In the industrial sector, the EU will eliminate 100% 
of its tariffs within 10 years - 80% of them at the agree-
ment’s onset. Mercosur will consequently liberalize 91% of 
volume trade and tariff lines. The agreement recognizes 
states' rights regarding regulation to achieve legitimate 
public policy objectives: defines categories of technicians 
and business people who may temporarily engage in eco-
nomic activity in the territory of the other bloc, and estab-
lishes principles on transparency in the adoption of regula-
tions.15 
 The agreement will reduce the costs of import and 
export of goods, as well as lessen bureaucracy and increase 
transparency for the economic actors. The agreement also 
reaffirms a number of commitments, including combating 
anticompetitive practices such as the formation of cartels; 
the protection of working conditions and the environment; 
and expanding the available mechanisms for resolving 
trade disputes. 
 The EU-Mercosur trade agreement is supposed to 
be phased in over 15 years and establishes frameworks that 
go beyond the WTO. These criteria guarantee the commit-
ment to dialogue prior to the adoption of regulations, the 
granting of deadlines for submission of comments and 
compliance with existing international standards in regu-
lated matters.  This outline also reassures regulatory im-
pact assessments. 
Mercosur In The Global Arena 
Although it is a four member economic institution, Mer-
cosur is unquestionably led by Argentina and Brazil. As 
long ago as the 1940s, north-american geopolitician Nicho-
las Spykman of Yale University identified both countries as 
part of an equidistant zone: "as far from New York as from 
Lisbon and as open to European as to north-american in-
fluence."16 The distance and nexus of the relationship be-
tween the two has given considerable potential to all of 
Mercosur’s members.  With the recent overtures made by 
Mercosur it can be lucidly recognized that the economic 
block is definitively looking outward and positioning itself 
to become a global participant, a distinct benefit to all the 
member nations. 
 
Brazil and Argentina: friends and rivals 
Mercosur was a conciliatory effort mobilized by former 
Presidents José Sarney, from Brazil, and Raúl Alfolsín, 
from Argentina. In one way or another, Brazil and Argenti-
na have been friends and rivals over the course of their 
neighborly history and their respective roles in Mercosur 
reflects this, as does Mercosur ́s trajectory. Brazil-
Argentine relations started as Portugal-Argentine relations. 
The European nation was the first one to recognize Argen-
tine independence from Spain in 1821.  Present day Argen-
tina was known as the Provincias Unidas del Rio de la Plata 
until officially named Argentina in the Argentine Constitu-
tion of 1826. Antônio Manuel Correa da Câmara conceiva-
                                                             
15 http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/images/2019/2019_07_03_-
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16 "Latin America and Europe have much to gain from closer 
ties", The Economist, July 25, 2019. 
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bly the first foreign diplomatic authority to be assigned to 
the new sovereign nation. Similarly it has been argued that 
Argentina was the first country to recognize Brazil as an 
independent State.  
There are those who argue that either the United States 
or Benin was the first country to recognize Brazil.17 How-
ever, the official Brazilian government narrative leans to-
wards Argentina, due to the fact that the Argentine Foreign 
Affairs Minister Bernardino Rivadavia expressly docu-
mented it in June of 1823. The initial friendliness was 
quickly substituted by rivalry. The Cisplatina region, which 
is present day Uruguay, was declared independent from 
Brazil by the revolutionaries in the Uruguayan city of La 
Florida, which sided with Argentina. Diplomatic relations 
between the two South American giants were then broken 
off and the Cisplatine War commenced  in 1825. As a result 
of this clash between Brazil and Argentina, Uruguay was 
spawned as a buffer state. 
The mid-twentieth century was a key-period for both 
the development of both nations' development. In 1930, 
both countries faced coups d’états: Brazilian landowner 
and politician Getúlio Vargas led a civil revolution, ousting 
president-elect Júlio Prestes and closing the Café com leite 
(“Coffee with milk”) politics era in October. One month 
before in Argentina, Lieutenant General Uriburu replaced 
Hipólito Yrigoyen through a military putsch, applauded by 
a young Juan Perón, inaugurated what is known as the 
década infame in Argentina. 
Mercosur´s destiny will be similarly determined by con-
certed political platforms: a decompassing relation between 
Brazilian and Argentine chiefs of state leads to a shaky 
Mercosur - not necessarily the end of it, but most likely its 
stagnation. .  However, ideology is not the sole underlying 
motif concerning Brazilian-Argentine relations. Sometimes 
there can be political proximity, but a circunstancial gap. 
That is the case of mid-1970’s latino dictatorships. From 
1976 to 1979, Brazil and Argentina were both ruled by mili-
tary regimes. Naturally, each one had its own agenda: 
whereas Brazil was on track with its frank positivist roots, 
Argentina was fresh out of a coup d’état against Isabel Pe-
rón.  
The late 70’s was an unsettling period in Brazilian-
Argentine relations. Videla blocked a tunnel within the 
Argentine-Chilean border, preventing Brazilian trucks to 
pass. In retaliation, Brazil closed its borders to Argentine 
trucks.18 Brazilian diplomat Alessandro Warley Candéas 
considers the 1970s Brazilian Miracle instigated a sense of 
rivalry in los hermanos, who were profoundly immersed in 
a never-ending economic rollercoaster.   
                                                             
17 Randig, Rodrigo Wiese. Argentina, primeiro país a reconhecer 
a independência do Brasil. Cadernos do CHDD, Fundação Alex-
andre de Gusmão, Year 16,  Number 31, Second Semester of 
2017, p. 5. Available at: 
[http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/images/ficha_pais/artigo-
argentina.pdf] 
18 Candeás, Alessandro Werley. Relações Brasil-Argentina, uma 
análise de avanços e recuos. Rev. bras. polít. int. [online]. 
2005, vol.48, n.1, p. 22. Available at: 
[http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rbpi/v48n1/v48n1a07.pdf] 
Two hundred years after their respective national 
births, the constant back and forth swing between friend-
ship and rivalry continues. The new millennium dawned 
and Mercosur became a regional economic bunker for four 
the nations south of the Equator.  Certainly, the idea was to 
forge a counterweight to US and European Union economic 
domination.19 The leitmotif being strengthening bilateral 
and regional ties as a means of establishing a Buenos Aires 
consensus. A means to foster this economic creativity was 
furthering an interamerican Import Substitution Industri-
alization model and promoting deeper ties within Mer-
cosur’s structure. 
However, after Jair Bolsonaro’s election in 2018, there 
is a stark shift regarding Brazil's role in Mercosur. During 
the campaign trail, Paulo Guedes stated that “Mercosur is 
not a priority” any longer. Eventually, Mr. Guedes himself 
mitigated his own words. The Chicago economist later 
manifested that Mercosur could be a vehicle for liberaliza-
tion.  At first, the idea was generally well received. The 
results were perspicuous: a Macri-Bolsonaro unsteady alli-
ance and the Mercosur-EU agreement. Mercosur quickly 
recovered from a turbulent 2018 and seemed to regain 
steam in 2019 in light of the EU-Mercosur agreement. 
However, as the friendship-rivalry effect continues and 
elections in Argentina ushered in Peronist sympathizers, 
the relationship between Mercosur's top two countries  
once again became tempestuous.  
The reason this time concerns Argentine elections: 
Macri was defeated by the Fernández-Kirchner joint ticket. 
Guedes and Bolsonaro made clear that a Kirchner return to 
the Casa Rosada would  not  be welcomed in Brasília.  
“Yo soy yo y mis circunstancias”, Ortega y Gasset’s cele-
brated aphorism, applies perfectly to the current Mercosur 
stand-off/crossroads. On one hand, ideological divergence 
may be a lethal threat to the block. On the other hand, any 
given circumstance may alter Argentina´s modus operandi 
concerning Mercosur free-trade present-day orientation: a 
Frente Amplio defeat in Uruguay, a surprising change of 
moods regarding current Argentinian leadership; a sudden 
change of events in the Bolsonaro administration. It could 
be anything.  However, this is not new and should not be 
taken at a calamitous face value, but rather looked upon as 
the occasional melle something akin to a sibling rivalry, 
among two nations that intertwined with each other.  
 
Praxis of Mercosur In The Global Arena 
The recent trade agreement between the European Un-
ion and Mercosur has finally brought the stagnant South 
American trade block to a higher international realm.  Un-
stable internal politics of the member nations prevented a 
further coherent external reach-out until now.  These re-
cent moments in Mercosur's history when Argentina and 
Brazil are somewhat politically aligned has clearly assisted 
the trade block in establishing a more progressive foreign 
policy, however, there exists a new strain as leftist politi-
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cian Alberto Fernandez recently won the Argentine presi-
dency.  
The signing of the free-trade agreement with the Euro-
pean Union has made Mercosur more of a world player.  
The imperfect customs union has been known for its re-
stricted access and detrimental internal political machina-
tions. Previous free trade agreements with Lebanon, Pales-
tine, and Israel were viewed as largely inconsequential. 
Although Brazil's current foreign policy players may not 
be completely enamored by Mercosur, the Common Market 
of the South still serves a purpose as being an important 
vehicle for Brazilian foreign policy.  Unlike many western 
nations, Brazil's foreign policy has historically been opera-
tionalized through the use of soft power in the forms of 
humanitarian and peace missions. Given the lack of eco-
nomic dearth of Paraguay and Uruguay and the seemingly 
consistent economic tumbles of Argentina, no other coun-
try of the pact is better able to lead and assert its vision for 
the block and at the same time use Mercosur as its own 
foreign policy outlet other than Brazil. Venezuela attempt-
ed to use Mercosur as a vehicle to promote itself and its 
warped foreign policy but it was subsequently suspended 
from the economic block due to its failure in following 
democratic principles.  Mercosur both directly and indi-
rectly serves one of Brazil's foreign policy objectives of be-
ing a regional power in South America whilst attempting to 
become a burgeoning world power. 
The EU-Mercosur trade pact not only gives more cre-
dence to the economic block on the world stage, but also 
enhances Brazil's rapport as an up-and-coming world pow-
er.  The current Brazilian administration is advancing a 
hardline free-market expansion economic policy with re-
ductions in import tariffs and making the country more 
open to international trade.  One of the prime objectives of 
the Bolsonaro administration is a more "freer” and open 
economy that is able to compete and trade with developing 
nations.  Mercosur's "step up" in the global arena is un-
doubtedly a Brazilian foreign policy achievement, achieved 
not only by the current Bolsonaro administration but a it is 
a concerted culmination effort by past Brazilian admin-
istrations of the last 20 years 
The trade deal has also raised the credibility of the 
member countries internationally.  There has even been 
talks of a possible Brazil-U.S. Free Trade agreement.  The 
agreement raises the four-member economic block as a 
potent player in international economic relations vice being 
viewed as a largely unorthodox economic anomaly without 
direction. In a way the signing of this agreement is bringing 
Mercosur countries closer to the neoliberal order and giv-
ing the members especially Brazil an opportunity to attain 
OECD membership.  
The politics of Latin American regionalism, Brazilian 
regional hegemony and Argentine hegemony play out on 
the world stage through Mercosur as an outlet as much as 
they are espoused by each member country of the trade 
block. As the Brazilian international relations scholar Jean 
Santos Lima attests, Latin America is a remarkable exam-
ple of how the concept of regions is not geographically de-
termined but shaped and reshaped by interactions among 
various regional actors, subject to international influ-
ences.20 The economic alliance between the EU and Mer-
cosur provides a sort of anchor in an increasingly multipo-
lar world for Mercosur. Actors such as the United States, 
China, and Russia have long attempted to persuade the 
region whether it be due to Latin America being in the 
same hemisphere, the Cold War, or the hunt for resources 
coupled with power expansion as is the case with China.  
Through this economic agreement, Mercosur has firmly 
established itself outside the "world powers construct" of 
China, Russia, and the United States while making its own 
case for multipolarity through joining with the EU to pro-
mote an alternative path to individual world powers he-
gemony.  The agreement also provides a unique and pur-
poseful path for the foreign policies of both Brazil and Ar-
gentina who not only have a strong cultural lexus with Eu-
rope but have been frustrated by world power domination. 
Mercosur has been a mainstay in South American inter-
national relations since its beginning in the early 90s.  
Aside from the political amalgam that make the trade pact 
unique, the common external tariff was something that 
gave the block a unpropitious feel. Other alliances or trade 
blocks in the regions such as ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for 
the Peoples of Our America) and UNASUR (Union of South 
American Nations) have had a less than notable showing 
due in part to being either a political ploy as in the former 
or as being seen as having unclear aims as in the case of the 
later.  Mercosur's staying power is likely derived from the 
peculiar asymmetry of it being both political, economic, 
and introspective—until now.  By signing the free-trade 
agreement with the EU, Mercosur is superseding other 
regional blocks and leading the way for South America in 
the global power paradigm.  As President Nixon once said, 
“Where Brazil goes South America follows." 
It is unquestionable that the move by Mercosur to 
achieve an economic trade pact with the EU is extremely 
beneficial to each country. As the dominant regional power, 
Brazil expects Mercosur to improve its bargaining power 
vís-a-vis the major powers, particularly the United States.21  
Paraguay and Uruguay have been eager participants in 
the expansion of Mercosur.  Paraguay ́s lack of access to 
the sea and Uruguay ́s small economy give both countries 
a natural impetus to be a part of Mercosur and any global 
out-reach that may be attained through expansion is wel-
come.  Both countries have been enthusiastic regarding the 
possibilities of opening up; President Cortes of Paraguay 
has requested Mercosur countries be granted more inde-
pendence to look for new markets and negotiate agree-
ments.        
Mercosur's junior members have also become observers 
of the Pacific Alliance, another sign of their desperation to 
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expand outside the block. The two minor members of the 
block have also attempted to negotiate bilateral economic 
agreements outside Mercosur, particularly with the United 
States but due to the external common tariff of Mercosur 
ran into an impasse. The timing for outward expansion is 
not only apt for the larger economies of Mercosur but it is 
something the block's junior members have been advocat-
ing for some time. 
Though the world may appear to be in a post-globalized 
world as large global powers are pronouncing their hegem-
ony something unique can be said in the way of emerging 
powers and other countries that clamor for the internation-
al stage.  Even without the United States the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership came into being as the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership as 13 
countries agreed to sign making it the third largest free 
trade zone in the world.  Hence, as world powers compete 
so do trade blocks.  Mercosur with somewhat of an urgency 
wishes to stay relevant internationally as trade blocks con-
solidate as a way to gain access in the global arena.  As per-
haps the most prolific trade block in the Southern Hemi-
sphere Mercosur needs to stay significant especially as 
Brazil would be the only major economy that does not par-
ticipate in nor benefit from major international agree-
ments. 22 For all the diatribes and complexities of Mercosur 
one affirmation is that it has ended a century and a half of 
geopolitical dispute between Brazil and Argentina, contrib-
uting to peace, prosperity and the consolidation of democ-
racy in the Southern Cone. 
Final Remarks 
The signing of the Mercosur-EU trade agreement has 
truly expanded the global reach of the South American 
trade block as a multilateral player and represents the sin-
gle largest trade deal ever pulled off by both the European 
Union and Mercosur. From the EU's perspective, the 
agreement reinforces its development model amidst a 
global protectionist wave and is part of a broader European 
reassessment of the Latin American region as a whole. 
Anabel González from the Person Institute for Interna-
tional Economics pointed out that from a geopolitical 
standpoint the EU-Mercosur agreement serves both parties 
well as they navigate turbulent global trade waters.23 In a 
world increasingly shaped by the economic rivalry between 
the United States and China, the countries that make up 
both regional integration processes must seek to strength-
en partnerships with third parties to better navigate this 
new geopolitical landscape. Thus, the international trade 
context was key: the dispute between Washington and Bei-
jing marginalized Europe and South America, encouraging 
their  cooperation. 
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The Mercosur-EU trade agreement is also part of a 
broader network of mega-regional FTAs that the EU has 
been pursuing over the past years, and establishes disci-
plines that go well beyond the WTO. However, the agree-
ment has no immediate effect and must be ratified by the 
member-countries' national parliaments of both trade 
blocks before it can enter into force, a substantial endeavor 
that will unfold over the several couple of years.   
The challenges this agreement has borne in the EU re-
flect internal EU political schisms as individual countries 
vote against this agreement due to environmental concerns 
or due to farmers´ protests.  These issues are evident 
through the recent rejection of the EU-Mercosur accord by 
both the Netherlands and Austria during the first half of 
2020.  In June of 2020 the Eurasia group analyzed that the 
treaty was "being put in the freezer", citing environmental 
concerns regarding Brazil's Amazon region.  Concerns over 
climate appear to be the main impediment to full blown 
ratification, however, with Portugal and Argentina having 
assumed the presidency of their respective blocks in early 
2021 both countries have resolved to overcome any issues 
that may hinder its advancement.   
Mercosur has been perpetually forward-leaning regard-
ing its intention of finalizing  this hallmark treaty, despite 
the current political differences among Mercosur member 
nations as can be recently seen by the doubts expressed by 
Argentine President Alberto Fernandez concerning the 
negotiations. However, President Fernandez´s foreign 
minister, Felipe Solá, declared that Argentina would not 
obstruct the advancement of the treaty. Nevertheless the 
treaty has enough forward momentum that barring a cata-
clysmic situation this juxtaposition between two major 
trade blocks will overcome the minor obstacles that stand 
in their way.  In a moment of global introspection resulting 
from increased nationalist sentiments, discord over climate 
change, and a global pandemic these two potent trade 
blocks will come together to be a formidable economic 
force.  
 
